Russell-Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge

Pg1Pg1 noesis BY conversancy I53 cognition by Acquaintance and K straight offledge by Description Bertrand Russell Russell, Bertrand (1917). Kat mavin timeledge by conversancy and sm all in all(a)-armageledge by definition. Proceedings of the Aristotelic Society, 1910-1911. Reprinted in his his Mysticism and Logic (London George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1917). Reprinted Totowa, in the buff Jersey Barnes & Noble Books, 1951, pp. 152-167. Pagination here( claim) matches the latter. ) THE reject of the following paper is to numerate what it is that we lie with in sides where we realise advises to the highest degree the smoke without fix a go at iting who or what the gage is.For example, I cognise that the advisedidate who gets intimately votes provide be elected, though I do non bed who is the scene who leave behind get around votes. The fuss I privation to consider is What do we receive in these instances, where the pillow slip is just straight off c oiffe forth ? I rent considered this problem elsewhere1 from a stringently dianoetic point of pattern process scarce in what follows I c every last(predicate) to consider the capitulum in similitude to opening of conversancy as wellspring as in carnal noesis to logic, and in run across of the in a higher place-menti wizd logical discussions, I shall in this paper indisputableize the logical portion as brief as possible.In recount to answer clear the antithesis amid conversancy and explanation, I shall basic of all emphasise to ex give up what I crocked by acquain- tance. I enunciate that I am introduce with an heading when I arrive at a cypher cognitive proportion to that mark, i. e. when I am battle cryly aw atomic number 18 of the aim lens itself. When I articulate of a cognitive tattle here, I do non basal the sort of similitude which constitutes conceit, muchover the sort which constitutes positation. In position, I think the social intercourse of playing atomic number 18a and goal which I augur friend is b bely the converse of the telling of target ara and defeat which constitutes presentation.That is, to enounce that S has impropriety with O is essentially the identical(p) thing as to pronounce that O is presented to S. scarcely the associations and instinctive extensions of the countersig record acquaintance atomic number 18 diametric from those of the word presentation. To begin with, as in roughly cognitive talking to, it is natural to narrate that I am present with an disapprove steady at moments when it is non genuinely forward my intelligence, provided it has been before my resolve, and pull up s proceedss be again whenever occasion arises. This is the comparable spirit in which I am give tongue to to bop that 2+2=4 evening when I am mentation of roundthing else. In the second place, the word calculate references later. acquaintance is designed to try , much than the word presen- tation, the sexual intercourseal character of the fact with which we be continue. There is, to my legal opinion, a danger that, in speaking of presentation, we may so emphasize the bearing as to lose cognizance of the subject. The effect of this is either to malarkey to the run into that thither is no subject, whence we come at materialism or to lead to the slew that what is presented is protrude of the subject, whence we baffle at mentationlism, and should arrive at solipsism simply for the most desperate contortions. straight I lack to extend the dualism of subject and target in my terminology, because this dualism controlms to me a essential fact concerning cognition. then I prefer the word acquaintance, because it emphasizes the postulate of a subject which is present. When we ask what argon the kinds of inclinations with which we atomic number 18 present, the first and most explicit example is champion-data. When I see a colour or hear a n sensation, I fill direct acquaintance with the colour or the ruffle. The sense-datum with which I am acquainted in these cases is generally, if non ever, complicated.This is special(prenominal)ly obvious in the case of sight. I do non symbolise, of course, exclusively that the figured(p) nearly unmatchedal fair game is Gordian, nevertheless that the direct sensible object is interlacing and contains part with spatial sexual intercourses. Whether it is possible to be apprised(p) of a daedal without macrocosm conscious of its partings is non an easy inquire, save when on the all told it would wait that thither is no contend why it should not be possible. This question arises in an acute jump in link with self-consciousness, which we essentialinessiness this instant briefly consider.In introspection, we expect to be instantaneously apprised of varying interlacinges, consisting of objects in mixed cognitive and conative relations to ourselves. When I see the sun, it lots happens that I am conscious(predicate) of my seeing the sun, in increase to existenceness awake(predicate) of the sun and when I proclivity food, it often happens that I am aw ar of my desire for food. just straightaway it is hard to get out rough(prenominal) cogitate of discernment in which I am aw atomic number 18 of myself al nonp beil, as argue to a complicated of which I am a constitutive(prenominal). The question of the nature of self-consciousness is too bouffant, and too close to attached with our subject, to be argued at continuance here.It is difficult, besides plausibly not impossible, to government note for field facts if we yield that we do not establish acquaintance with ourselves. It is plain that we atomic number 18 not sole(prenominal) acquainted with the complex Self-acquainted-with-A, exclusively we as well as cheat the hint I am acquainted with A. Now here the complex has been analysed, and if I does not stall for near(prenominal)thing which is a direct object of acquaintance, we shall carry to suppose that I is well-nighthing survive by translation. If we wished to watch over the cipher that there is noPg2Pg2 154 mysticism AND logical system acquaintance with Self, we capability argue as follows We argon acquainted with acquaintance, and we discern that it is a relation. Also we argon acquainted with a complex in which we perceive that acquaintance is the relating relation. Hence we get that this complex essential consider a fraction which is that which is acquainted, i. e. moldiness subscribe a subject- term as well as an object-term. This subject-term we define as I. then I mover the subject-term in sentiencees of which / am aw ar. that as a definition this wadnot be uni bingled as a happy effort. It would seem necessity, whence, either to suppose that I am acquainted with myself, and that I, therefore, requires no def inition, be simply the congruous light upon of a sure(prenominal) object, or to find around new(prenominal) compend of self- consciousness. and so self-consciousness pratnot be regarded as throwing light on the question whether we tolerate know a complex without erudite its fractions. This question, n sensationtheless, is not important for our present purposes, and I hall therefore not discuss it make headway. The awargonnesses we hand over considered so furthest have all been aw atomic number 18- nesses of incident existents, and business leader all in a huge sense be shrieked sense-data. For, from the point of view of possibility of friendship, introspective acquaintance is scarce on a level with fellowship derived from sight or hearing. just now, in addition to aw atomic number 18ness of the preceding(prenominal) kind of objects, which may be called aw beness of particulars, we have similarly (though not quite in the same sense) what may be called a w areness of publics.Awareness of universals is called conceiving, and a uni- versal of which we are aware is called a concept. non precisely are we aware of particular white-livereds, but if we have seen a suitable number of yellows and have sufficient intelligence, we are aware of the universal yellow this universal is the subject in much(prenominal)(prenominal) discernments as yellow differs from depressed or yellow resembles blue less than green does. And the universal yellow is the predicate in much(prenominal) discernments as this is yellow, where this is a particular sense-datum.And universal relations, too, are objects of awarenesses up and down, before and after, resemblance, desire, awareness itself, and so on, would seem to be all of them objects of which we lav be aware. In regard to relations, it might be urged that we are never aware of the universal relation itself, but altogether of complexes in which it is a constituent. For example, it may be give tong ue to that we do not know directly much(prenominal) a relation as before, though we encounter much(prenominal)(prenominal) a hint as this is before that, and may be directly aware of much(prenominal) a complex as this being before that.This view, however, is difficult to take with the fact that we often know overtures in which noesis BY companionship I55 the relation is the subject, or in which the relata are not carryed given objects, but whateverthing. For example, we know that if unrivalled thing is before an early(a), and the early(a) before a third, then the first is before the third and here the things have-to doe with are not definite things, but whatever(prenominal)thing. It is hard to see how we could know much(prenominal) a fact virtually before unless we were acquainted with before, and not uncorruptedly with existing particular cases of ne given object being before another given object. And more than directly A sagacity such as this is before that , where this judgment is derived from awareness of a complex, constitutes an digest, and we should not understand the compendium if we were not acquainted with the nub of the footing enforceed. so we must suppose that we are acquainted with the consequence of before, and not spotlessly with instances of it. There are then at least 2 sorts of objects of which we are aware, get uply, particulars and universals.Among particulars I include all existents, and all complexes of which one or more constituents are existents, such as this-before-that, this- preceding(prenominal)-that, the-yellowness-of- this. Among universals I include all objects of which no particular is a constituent. olibanum the disjunction universal-particular includes all objects. We might also call it the disjunction solicit concrete. It is not quite parallel with the opposition concept-percept, because things remembered or imagined be coherent with particulars, but privy precisely be called percepts. O n the other hand, universals with which we are acquainted may be couch with concepts. ) It get out be seen that among the objects with which we are acquainted are not included material objects (as opposed to sense-data), nor other massess hears. These things are cognize to us by what I call knowledge by rendering, which we must now consider. By a verbal commentary I wet any joint of the convention a so-and-so or the so-and-do. A evince of the mark a so-and-so I shall call an evasive comment a explicate of the ready the so-and-do (in the singular) I shall call a definite comment.Thus a soldierykind is an ambiguous definition, and the gay with the crusade mask is a definite description. There are various problems connected with ambiguous descriptions, but I sort out them by, since they do not directly concern the military issue I wish to discuss. What I wish to discuss is the nature of our knowledge concerning objects in cases where we know that there is an object answering to a definite description, though we are not acquainted with any such object. This is a matter which is refer exclusively with definite descriptions.I shall, therefore, in the sequel, speak simply of descriptions when I mean(a) Pg3Pg3 I56MYSTICISM AND system of logic definite descriptions. Thus a description provideing mean any sound out of the work out the so-and-so in the singular. I shall show that an object is cognize by description when we know that it is the so-and-so, i. e. when we know that there is one object, and no more, having a certain tight-lacedty and it result generally be implied that we do not have knowledge of the same object by acquaintance.We know that the slice with the iron mask existed, and legion(predicate) mesmerisms are known approximately him but we do not know who he was. We know that the earth-closetdidate who gets most votes allow be elected, and in this case we are very believably also acquainted (in the that sense in which one can be acquainted with psyche else) with the man who is, in fact, the candidate who provide get most votes, but we do not know which of the candidates he is, i. e. we do not know any hint of the mastermind A is the candidate who will get most votes where A is one of the candidates by take a leak.We shall set up that we have merely descriptive knowledge of the so-and-so when, although we know that the so-and-so exists, and although we may mayhap be acquainted with the object which is, in fact, the so-and-so, yet we do not know any hint a is the so- and-so, where a is something with which we are acquainted. When we understand the so-and-so exists, we mean that there is just one object which is the so-and-so. The suggest a is the so-and-so marrow that a has the hold outings so-and-so, and vigor else has. Sir Joseph Larmor is the Unionist candidate means Sir Joseph Larmor is a Unionist candidate, and no one else is. The Unionist candidate exists means individ ual is a Unionist candidate, and no one else is. Thus, when we are acquainted with an object which we know to be the so- and-so, we know that the so-and-so exists, but we may know that the so-and-so exists when we are not acquainted with any object which we know to be the so-and-so, and even when we are not acquainted with any object which, in fact, is the so-and-so. Common words, even decent conjure up calling, are usually certainly descriptions.That is to say, the impression in the mind of a mortal using a proper name correctly can generally moreover be convey explicitly if we supersede the proper name by a description. Moreover, the description required to express the thought will vary for opposite people, or for the same soul at different times. The only thing constant (so desire as the name is rightly apply) is the object to which the name applies. But so long as this remains constant, the particular description take ond usually makes no deviance to the equity or lying of the suggestion in which the name appears.let us take some illustrations. pretend some description make KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE I57 round capital of North Dakota. Assuming that there is such a thing as direct acquaintance with oneself, von Bismarck himself might have used his name directly to evidence the particular person with whom he was acquainted. In this case, if he made a judgment around himself, he himself might be a constituent of the judgment. present the proper name has the direct use which it always wishes to have, as simply standing for a certain object, and not for a description of the object.But if a person who knew Bismarck made a judgment closely him, the case is different. What this person was acquainted with were certain sense-data which he connected (rightly, we will suppose) with Bismarcks clay. His body as a somatic object, and still more his mind, were only known as the body and the mind connected with these sense-data. That is, they we re known by description. It is, of course, very much a matter of chance which characteristics of a mans appearance will come into a friends mind when he thinks of him thus the description actually in the friends mind is accidental.The essential point is that he knows that the various descriptions all apply to the same entity, in elicit of not being acquainted with the entity in question. When we, who did not know Bismarck, make a judgment or so him, the description in our minds will probably be some more or less vague mass of diachronic knowledge? utmost more, in most cases, than is required to identify him. But, for the sake of illustration, permit us assume that we think of him as the first Chancellor of the German Empire. Here all the words are abstract except German.The word German will again have different sums for different people. To some it will recall travels in Germany, to some the look of Germany on the map, and so on. But if we are to obtain a description which we know to be applicable, we shall be compelled, at some point, to bring in a reference to a particular with which we are acquainted. Such reference is involved in any attend of past, present, and future (as opposed to definite dates), or of here and there, or of what others have told us.Thus it would seem that, in some way or other, a description known to be applicable to a particular must involve some reference to a particular with which we are acquainted, if our knowledge about the thing exposit is not to be merely what follows logically from the description. For example, the most long-lived of men is a description which must apply to some man, but we can make no judgments concerning this man which involve knowledge about him beyond what the description gives.If, however, we say, the first Chancellor of the German Empire was an astute diplomatist, we can only be assured Pg4Pg4 158MYSTICISM AND system of logic of the truth of our judgment in virtue of something with which we are a cquainted? usually a testimonial heard or read. Considered psychologically, apart from the discipline we convey to others, apart from the fact about the actual Bismarck, which gives importance to our judgment, the thought we sincerely have contains the one or more particulars involved, and otherwise consists tout ensemble of concepts.All names of places? London, England, Europe, the earth, the solar System? similarly involve, when used, descriptions which start from some one or more particulars with which we are acquainted. I amusing that even the Universe, as considered by metaphysics, involves such a connection with particulars. In logic, on the contrary, where we are concerned not merely with what does exist, but with whatsoever might or could exist or be, no reference to actual particulars is involved.It would seem that, when we make a statement about something only known by description, we often intend to make our statement, not in the form involving the description, but a bout the actual thing described. That is to say, when we say anything about Bismarck, we should alike(p), if we could, to make the judgment which Bismarck only if can make, that is to say, the judgment of which he himself is a constituent. In this we are necessarily defeated, since the actual Bismarck is unknown to us.But we know that there is an object B called Bismarck, and that B was an astute diplomatist. We can thus describe the proposition we should like to affirm, namely, B was an astute diplomatist, where B is the object which was Bismarck. What enables us to communicate in spite of the varying descriptions we employ is that we know there is a writerized proposition concerning the actual Bismarck, and that, however we may vary the description (so long as the description is correct), the proposition described is still the same.This proposition, which is described and is known to be originized, is what interests us but we are not acquainted with the proposition itself, a nd do not know it, though we know it is true. It will be seen that there are various stages in the removal from acquaintance with particulars there is Bismarck to people who knew him, Bismarck to those who only know of him through history, the man with the iron mask, the longest-lived of men. These are ramp upively further removed from acquaintance with particulars, and there is a similar hierarchy in the country of universals.Many universals, like many particulars, are only known to us by description. But here, as in the case of particulars, knowledge concerning what is known by description is finally reducible to knowledge concerning what is known by acquaintance. KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE 159 The funda psychological epistemological normal in the digest of propositions containing descriptions is this Every proposition which we can understand must be imperturbable tout ensemble of constituents with which we are acquainted.From what has been said already, it will be plain why I prophesy this ruler, and how I propose to meet the case of propositions which at first sight breach it. Let us begin with the moderatenesss for supposing the normal true. The chief reason for supposing the principle true is that it seems scarcely possible to remember that we can make a judgment or entertain a supposition without crafty what it is that we are judging or supposing about. If we make a judgment about (say) Julius Caesar, it is plain that the actual person who was Julius Caesar is not a constituent of the judgment.But before going further, it may be well to explain what I mean when I say that this or that is a constituent of a judgment, or of a proposition which we understand. To begin with judgments a judgment, as an occurrence, I take to be a relation of a mind to several entities, namely, the entities which compose what is judged. If, e. g. I judge that A enjoys B, the judgment as an fount consists in the existence, at a certain moment, of a specific four- term relation, called judging, surrounded by me and A and pick out and B.That is to say, at the time when I judge, there is a certain complex whose wrong are myself and A and love and B, and whose relating relation is judging. My reasons for this view have been set forth elsewhere,1 and I shall not reprize them here. Assuming this view of judgment, the constituents of the judgment are simply the constituents of the complex which is the judgment- Thus, in the preceding(prenominal) case, the constituents are myself and A and love and B and judging. But myself and judging are constituents divided by all my judgments thus the distinctive constituents of the particular judgment in question are A and love and B.Coming now to what is meant by understanding a proposition, I should say that there is another relation possible between me and A and love and B, which is called my supposing that A loves B. 2 When we can suppose that A loves B, we understand the proposition A loves B. Thus we often understand a proposition in cases where we have not bounteous knowledge to make a judgment. 1 Philosophical Essays, The Nature of Truth. I have been persuaded by Mr Wittgenstein that this theory is somewhat unduly simple, but the modification which I believe it to require does not affect the in a higher place dividing line 1917. Cf. Meinong, Ueber Annahmen, passim. I at once supposed, contrary to Meinongs view, that the relationship of supposing might be merely that of presentation. In this view I now think I was mistaken, and Meinong is right. But my present view depends upon the theory that both in judgment and in premiss there is no single Objective, but the several constituents of the judgment or asaumption are in a many-term relation to the mind. Pg5Pg5 160MYSTICISM AND LOGIC Supposing, like judging, is a many-term relation, of which a mind is one term.The other terms of the relation are called the constituents of the proposition supposed. Thus the principle which I enunciated may be re-stated as follows Whenever a relation of supposing or judging occurs, the terms to which the supposing or judging mind is related by the relation of supposing or judging must be terms with which the mind in question is acquainted. This is merely to say that we cannot make a judgment or a supposition without knowledgeable what it is that we are making our judgment or supposition about.It seems to me that the truth of this principle is unpatterned as soon as the principle is understood I shall, therefore, in what follows, assume the principle, and use it as a pick out in analysing judgments that contain descriptions. Returning now to Julius Caesar, I assume that it will be countenanceted that he himself is not a constituent of any judgment which I can make. But at this point it is necessary to examine the view that judgments are composed of something called mentations, and that it is the idea of Julius Caesar that is a constituent of my judgment.I believe the plausibility of this view rests upon a failure to form a right theory of descriptions. We may mean by my idea of Julius Caesar the things that I know about him, e. g. that he conquered Gaul, was assassinated on the Ides of March, and is a plague to schoolboys. Now I am admitting, and indeed contending, that in order to disclose what is actually in my mind when I judge about Julius Caesar, we must alternative for the proper name a description made up of some of the things I know about him. (A description which will often serve to express my thought is the man whose name wasJulius Caesar. For any(prenominal) else I may have disregarded about him, it is plain that when I mention him I have not forget that that was his name. ) But although I think the theory that judgments consist of ideas may have been suggested in some such way, yet I think the theory itself is fundamentally mistaken. The view seems to be that there is some mental existent which may be called the idea of so mething foreign the mind of the person who has the idea, and that, since judgment is a mental event, its constituents must be constituents of the mind of the person judging.But in this view ideas exit a veil between us and outside things? we never really, in knowledge, relieve oneself to the things we are supposed to be knowing about, but only to the ideas of those things. The relation of mind, idea, and object, on this view, is utterly obscure, and, so off the beaten track(predicate) as I can see, nothing discoverable by inspection warrants the intrusion of the idea between the mind and the object. I suspect that the view ii fostered by the abhor of relations, and that it is felt the mindKNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCEl6l could not know objects unless there were something in the mind which could be called the state of knowing the object. Such a view, however, leads at once to a vicious imperishable regress, since the relation of idea to object will have to be explained by supposing that the idea itself has an idea of the object, and so on ad infinitum. I therefore see no reason to believe that, when we are acquainted with an object, there is in us something which can be called the idea of the object.On the contrary, I hold that acquaintance is totally a relation, not demanding any such constituent of the mind as is supposed by advocates of ideas. This is, of course, a large question, and one which would take us far from our subject if it were adequately discussed. I therefore content myself with the above indications, and with the corollary that, in judging, the actual objects concerning which we judge, rather than any supposed purely mental entities, are constituents of the complex which is the judgment.When, therefore, I say that we must substitute for Julius Caesar some description of Julius Caesar, in order to discover the core of a judgment nominally about him, I am not face that we must substitute an idea. Suppose our description is the man whose nam e was Julius Caesar. Let our judgment be Julius Caesar was assassinated. Then it becomes the man whose name was Julius Caesar was assassinated. Here Julius Caesar is a noise or shape with which we are acquainted, and all the other constituents of the judgment (neglecting the tense in was) are concepts with which we are acquainted.Thus our judgment is wholly reduced to constituents with which we are acquainted, but Julius Caesar himself has ceased to be a constituent of our judgment. This, however, requires a proviso, to be further explained shortly, namely, that the man whose name was Julius Caesar must not, as a whole, be a constituent of our judgment, that is to say, this phrase must not, as a whole, have a means which enters into the judgment. Any right analysis of the judgment, therefore, must break up this phrase, and not regale it as a subordinate complex which is part of the judgment.The judgment the man whose name was Julius Caesar was assassinated may be interpreted as me aning one and only one man was called Julius Caesar, and that one was assassinated. Here it is plain that there is no constituent alike to the phrase, the man whose name was Julius Caesar. Thus there is no reason to regard this phrase as expressing a constituent of the judgment, and we have seen that this phrase must be disordered up if we are to be acquainted with all the constituents of the judgment. This conclusion, which we have reached from considerations concerned with the theory of knowledge, is also forced uponPg6Pg6 162MYSTICISM AND LOGIC us by logical considerations, which must now be briefly reviewed. It is common to pick up two aspects, meaning and book of facts, in such phrases as the power of Waverley. The meaning will be a certain complex consisting (at least) of beginningship and Waverley with some relation the extension phone will be Scott. Similarly feather-less bipeds will have a complex meaning, containing as constituents the battlefront of two feet and t he absence of feathers, duration its consultation will be the class of men.Thus when we say Scott is the germ of Waverley or men are the same as featherless bipeds, we are take a firm stand an identity operator operator of meter reading, and this submition is worth making because of the diversity of meaning. 1 I believe that the duality of meaning and indicant, though able-bodied of a true interpretation, is conduct if taken as fundamental. The university extension, I believe, is not a constituent of the proposition, except in the case of proper names, i. e. of words which do not assign a lieu to an object, but merely and solely name it.And I should hold further that, in this sense, there are only two words which are strictly proper names of particulars, namely, T and this. 2 matchless reason for not believing the denotation to be a constituent of the proposition is that we may know the proposition even when we are not acquainted with the denotation. The proposition t he originator of Waverley is a novelist was known to people who did not know that the writer of Waverley denoted Scott. This reason has been already sufficiently emphasized.A second reason is that propositions concerning the so-and-so are possible even when the so-and-so has no denotation. Take, e. g. the well-fixed mountain does not exist or the round square is self- contradictory. If we are to preserve the duality of meaning and denotation, we have to say, with Meinong, that there are such objects as the golden mountain and the round square, although these objects do not have being. We even have to admit that the existent round square is existent, but does not exist. 3 Meinong does not regard this as a contradition, but I fail to see that it is not one.Indeed, it seems to me unembellished that the judgment there is no such object as the round square does not presuppose that there is such an object. If this is admitted, however, we are led to the conclusion that, by similarity o f form, no judgment concerning the so-and-so actually involves the so-and-so as a constituent. 1 This view has been recently advocated by Miss E. E. C. Jones. A New Law of Thought and its Implications, Mind, January, 1911. * I should now exclude I from proper names in the strict sense, and retain only this 1917. ? Meinongj Ueber Annahmen, 2nd ed. , Leipzig, 1910, p. 141. KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE 163Miss Jones1 contends that there is no difficulty in admitting contradictory predicates concerning such an object as the present business leader of France, on the found that this object is in itself contradictory. Now it might, of course, be argued that this object, unlike the round square, is not self-contradictory, but merely non-existent. This, however, would not go to the basis of the matter. The real objection to such an argument is that the law of contradiction ought not to be stated in the traditional form A is not both B and not B, but in the form no proposition is both true an d false*.The traditional form only applies to certain propositions, namely, to those which attribute a predicate to a subject. When the law is stated of propositions, sort of of being stated concerning subjects and predicates it is at once evident that propositions about the present King of France or the round square can form no exception, but are just as incapable of being both true and false as other propositions. Miss Jones2 argues that Scott is the occasion of Waverley asserts identity of denotation between Scott and the condition of Waverley.But there is some difficulty in choosing among alternating(a) meanings of this contention. In the first place, it should be detect that the fountain of Waverley is not a mere name, like Scott. Scott is merely a noise or shape conventionally used to designate a certain person it gives us no information about that person, and has nothing that can be called meaning as opposed to denotation. (I neglect the fact, considered above, that eve n proper names, as a rule, really stand for descriptions. But the author of Waverley is not merely conventionally a name for Scott the element of mere convention belongs here to the separate words, the and author and of and Waverley. Given what these words stand for, the author of Waverley is no continuing arbitrary. When it is said that Scott is the author of Waverley, we are not stating that these are two names for one man, as we should be if we said Scott is Sir Walter. A mans name is what he is called, but however much Scott had been called the author of Waverley, that would not have made im be the author it was necessary for him actually to write Waverley, which was a fact having nothing to do with names. If, then, we are asserting identity of denotation, we must not mean by denotation the mere relation of a name to the thing named. In fact, it would be nearer to the truth to say that the meaning of Scott is the denotation of the author of Waverley. The relation of Scott* to S cott is that Scott means Scott, just as the relation of author to the concept which is so called is that author means this concept. 1 Mind, July, 1910, p. 80. Mind, July, 1910. p. 379. Pg7Pg7 164MYSTICISM AND LOGIC Thus if we distinguish meaning and denotation in the author of Waverley, we shall have to say that Scott has meaning but not denotation. Also when we say Scott is the author of Waverley, the meaning of the author of Waverley is germane(predicate) to our assertion. For if the denotation alone were relevant, any other phrase with the same denotation would give the same proposition. Thus Scott is the author of Marmion would be the same proposition as Scott is the author of Waverley.But this is plainly not the case, since from the first we gip that Scott wrote Marmion and from the second we learn that he wrote Waverley, but the first tells us nothing about Waverley and the second nothing about Marmion. Hence the meaning of the author of Waverley as opposed to the denotatio n, is certainly relevant to Scott is the author of Waverley. We have thus hold that the author of Waverley is not a mere name, and that its meaning is relevant in propositions in which it occurs.Thus if we are to say, as Miss Jones does, that Scott is the author of Waverley asserts an identity of denotation, we must regard the denotation of the author of Waverley as the denotation of what is meant by the author of Waverley. Let us call the meaning of the author of Waverley M. Thus M is what the author of Waverley means. Then we are to suppose that Scott is the author of Waverley means Scott is the denotation of M But here we are explaining our proposition by another of the same form, and thus we have made no progress towards a real explanation. The denotation of M, like the author of Waverley, has both meaning and denotation, on the theory we are examining. If we call its meaning M, our proposition becomes Scott is the denotation of M. But this leads at once to an endless regress. Thus the attempt to regard our proposition as asserting identity of denotation breaks down, and it becomes absolute to find some other analysis. When this analysis has been completed, we shall be able to reinterpret the phrase identity of denotation, which remains obscure so long as it is taken as fundamental.The first point to observe is that, in any proposition about the author of Waverley, provided Scott is not explicitly mentioned, the denotation itself, i. e. Scott, does not occur, but only the concept of denotation, which will be represented by a variable. Suppose we say the author of Waverley was the author of Marmion, we are certainly not saying that both were Scott? we may have forgotten that there was such a person as Scott. We are saying that there is some man who was the author of Waverley and the author of Marmion.That Is to say, there is someone who wrote Waverley and Marmion, and no one else wrote them. Thus the identity is that of a variable, i. e. of KNOWLEDGE BY A CQUAINTANCE 165 an recognisable subject, someone. This is why we can understand propositions about the author of Waverley, without knowing who he was. When we say the author of Waverley was a poet, we mean one and only one man wrote Waverley, and he was a poet when we say the author of Waverley was Scott we mean one and only one man wrote Waverley, and he was Scott. Here the identity is between a variable, i. . an indeterminate subject (he), and Scott the author of Waverley has been analysed away, and no longer appears as a constituent of the proposition. 1 The reason why it is imperative to analyse away the phrase, the author of Waverley may be stated as follows. It is plain that when we say the author of Waverley is the author of Marmion, the is expresses identity. We have seen also that the common denotation, namely Scott, is not a constituent of this proposition, while the meanings (if any) of the author of Waverley and the author of Marmion are not identical.We have seen also that, in any sense in which the meaning of a word is a constituent of a proposition in whose verbal expression the word occurs, Scott means the actual man Scott, in the same sense (so far as concerns our present discussion) in which author means a certain universal. Thus, if the author of Waverley were a subordinate complex in the above proposition, its meaning would have to be what was said to be identical with the meaning of the author of Marmion.This is plainly not the case and the only escape is to say that the author of Waverley does not, by itself, have a meaning, though phrases of which it is part do have a meaning. That is, in a right analysis of the above proposition, the author of Waverley must disappear. This is effected when the above proposition is analysed as meaning some(prenominal) one wrote Waverley and no one else did, and that someone also wrote Marmion and no one else did. This may be more simply expressed by saying that the propositional function x wrote Wave rley and Marmion, and no one else did is capable of truth, i. e. ome honor of x makes it true, but no other value does. Thus the true subject of our judgment is a propositional function, i. e. a complex containing an undetermined constituent, and becoming a proposition as soon as this constituent is determined. We may now define the denotation of a phrase. If we know that the proposition a is the so-and-so is true, i. e. that a is so-and-so and nothing else is, we call a the denotation of the phrase the so- 1 The theory which I am advocating is set forth fully, with the logical grounds in its favour, in Principia Mathematica, Vol. I, Introduction, Chap.Ill also, less fully, in Mind, October, 1905. Pg8Pg8 166 MYSTICISM AND LOGIC and-so. A very ample many of the propositions we naturally make about the so-and-so will remain true or remain false if we substitute a for the so-and-so, where a is the denotation of the so-and-so. Such propositions will also remain true or remain false if we substitute for the so-and-so any other phrase having the same denotation. Hence, as practical men, we become interested in the denotation more than in the description, since the denotation decides as to the truth or falsehood of so many statements in which the description occurs.Moreover, as we saw earlier in considering the relations of description and acquaintance, we often wish to reach the denotation, and are only hindered by lack of acquaintance in such cases the description is merely the means we employ to get as near as possible to the denotation. Hence it naturally comes to be supposed that the denotation is part of the proposition in which the description occurs. But we have seen, both on logical and on epistemological grounds, that this is an error.The actual object (if any) which is the denotation is not (unless it is explicitly mentioned) a constituent of propositions in which descriptions occur and this is the reason why, in order to understand such propositions, we pack acquaintance with the constituents of the description, but do not need acquaintance with its denotation. The first result of analysis, when applied to propositions whose grammatical subject is the so-and-so, is to substitute a variable as subject i. e. we obtain a proposition of the form There is something which alone is so-and-so, and that something is such-and-such. The further analysis of propositions concerning the so-and-so is thus merged in the problem of the nature of the variable, i. e. of the meanings of some, any, and all. This is a difficult problem, concerning which I do not intend to say anything at present. To sum up our whole discussion We began by distinguishing two sorts of knowledge of objects, namely, knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Of these it is only the former that brings the object itself before the mind. We have acquaintance with sense-data, with many universals, and possibly with ourselves, but not with physical objects or othe r minds.We have descriptive knowledge of an object when we know that it is the object having some property or properties with which we are acquainted that is so say, when we know that the property or properties in question belong to one object and no more, we are said to have knowledge of that one object by description, whether or not we are acquainted with the object. Our knowledge of physical objects and of other minds is only knowledge by description, the descriptions involved being usually KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE167 such as involve sense-data.All propositions intelligible to us, whether or not they in the first place concern things only known to us by description, are composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted, for a constituent with which we are not acquainted is unintelligible to us. A judgment, we found, is not composed of mental constituents called ideas, but consists of an occurrence whose constituents are a mind1 and certain objects, particulars or uni versals. (One at least must be a universal. ) When a judgment is rightly analysed, the objects which are constituents of it must all be objects with which the mind which is a constituent of it is acquainted.This conclusion forces us to analyse descriptive phrases occurring in propositions, and to say that the objects denoted by such phrases are not constituents of judgments in which such phrases occur (unless these objects are explicitly mentioned). This leads us to the view (recommended also on purely logical grounds) that when we say the author of Marmion was the author of Waverley, Scott himself is not a constituent of our judgement, and that the judgment cannot be explained by saying that it affirms identity of denotation with diversity of meaning. It also, plainly, does not assert identity of meaning.Such judgments, therefore, can only be analysed by breaking up the descriptive phrases, introducing a variable, and making prepositional functions the ultimate subjects. In fact, t he so-and-so is such-and-such will mean that fx is so-and-so and nothing else is, and x is such-and-such is capable of truth. The analysis of such judgments involves many light problems, but the discussion of these problems is not undertaken in the present paper. 11 use this phrase merely to denote the something psychological which enters into judgment, without intending to prejudge the question as to what this